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Introduction
Informational frictions impede the provision of external finance, particularly for companies with opaque, intangible assets. We study how partners at venture capital (VC) firms overcome such frictions by investing in company founders with whom they share a common ethnicity. Analyzing a large dataset covering a broad cross-section of the U.S. VC industry, we find that a shared ethnicity is associated with a higher probability that the VC firm invests in the company, stronger VC firm involvement conditional on such an investment taking place, and more entrepreneur-friendly financial contracts. These results are economically significant and are robust to a variety of controls, including VC firm and company fixed effects. However, we also show that a shared ethnicity is associated with a lower probability of successful exit. Our findings suggest that a shared ethnicity mitigates search, selection and monitoring costs, but VC firms appear to overestimate such benefits and either match with companies of inferior quality or do not impose a sufficient level of control on their portfolio companies.
By presenting detailed evidence on the importance of shared ethnicity in the U.S. VC market, we make two key contributions. Our first contribution is to validate the role of ethnic minorities in entrepreneurship by documenting the role ethnicity plays in the provision of venture finance. Research by Saxenian and coauthors suggests that entrepreneurs who are immigrants and/or belong to an ethnic minority form a large subgroup of all innovation-based founders in the United States (Saxenian 1999 (Saxenian , 2006 Wadhwa et al. 2007) . For companies launched between 1995 and 2005, there was at least one key immigrant founder in 25% of technology and engineering companies across the U.S., and in 52% of all companies based in Silicon Valley. A sizeable fraction of VC firms also employ professionals who come from an ethnic minority: Our data reveal that 14% of all VC firms have at least one partner who is either Chinese or Indian. Individuals with a shared ethnicity often form networks where they interact and exchange ideas with each other. As reported by Saxenian (2006) , there are at least 30 professional and networking associations targeting immigrants in Silicon Valley (e.g., The Indus Entrepreneur, TiE)
composing over 33,000 members. Collectively, these statistics suggest that ethnicity could be important for how the U.S. VC market operates. We formally test this expectation, and show that a shared ethnicity (between partners and founders) matters for whether, when and how VC firms invest in companies.
We add to the literature that shows the importance of ethnicity for trust (Glaeser, 2000; Fisman, 2003) , innovation (Agrawal et al., 2007; Kerr, 2008) and founding team composition (Ruef et al., 2003) .
More specifically, our evidence contributes to the growing literature showing that social proximity, in addition to geographical proximity, can matter for finance. Most existing papers study social proximity based on a shared university affiliation. One set of findings suggests that a shared university affiliation can be beneficial by helping mutual fund managers outperform the market (Cohen et al., 2008) , financial analysts make better forecasts (Cohen et al., 2010) , and firms borrow at lower rates (Engelberg et al., 2012) . Another set of findings, however, suggests that social ties based on university affiliation can be detrimental: it can worsen corporate governance (Nguyen, 2012) and increase the likelihood of fraud (Chidambaran et al., 2011) . 1 A final set of findings show that social ties based on university affiliation can make firms behave in more similar ways, with respect to investment policies (Fracassi, 2012) and executive compensation (Shue, forthcoming) .
Our second contribution is to shed new light on how VC firms overcome the severe informational frictions they encounter when financing entrepreneurial companies. Existing research has uncovered several methods that VCs use to improve their information collection before and after the investment is made: They specialize in industries, geographies and investment stages (Sorenson & Stuart, 2001; Chen et al., 2010) write sophisticated financial contracts (Kaplan & Stromberg, 2003 , 2004 Bengtsson & Sensoy, 2011) , experiment with new investment types (Sorensen, 2008) , are actively involved in their portfolio companies (Lerner, 1995; Hellmann & Puri, 2002) , and syndicate deals with other trusted VCs (Lerner, 1994; Hochberg et al., 2007 Hochberg et al., , 2010 . Common to these solutions is that they derive from VC firm's capabilities, rather than from the quality of the personal match between the VC firm's partners and the company's founders.
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1 Fracassi and Tate (2012) use memberships and affiliations to identify social ties, and show that powerful CEOs appoint board members based on such ties. The presence of ties is associated with lower market valuations.
The quality of the personal match is arguably important in the VC market. In contrast to the typical financings utilized by mature companies (i.e., public equity, bonds, and bank loans), people shape the demand and supply of venture capital financing to a significant degree. On the demand side, the individual founder's human capital is a key asset in a young, entrepreneurial company. On the supply side, the VC firm consists of individual partners who screen, monitor and provide operational support to portfolio companies. Thus, the success of an entrepreneurial company hinges critically on the capabilities of its founders and partners (Hsu, 2007; Sorensen, 2007) . Moreover, the relational nature of the VC market means that these two groups have frequent personal interactions with each other. Founders meet with partners during pitching, due diligence, contract negotiations, and board meetings. A high-quality match can arguably improve the company's success chances, whereas a low-quality match can create tensions that impede value-creation.
In this paper, we focus our attention on one dimension of person-based matching-ethnicitybecause it can be measured reliably and comprehensively, and, as we discussed above, matters in practice.
Our findings that VC firms implicitly use ethnicity for how they select, monitor and contract with entrepreneurs confirm anecdotal evidence that social networks and trusted referrals are important in explaining the matching process on the VC market (Fried & Hisrich, 1994) . From a broader perspective, the findings add to the literature on the impact of culture in economic exchange (Becker, 1996; Guiso et al. 2006; Iyer & Schoar, 2010) . That literature defines culture as a set of shared values, beliefs, and norms of a group or community (a definition that fits well with ethnic minorities).
We analyze a dataset from the U.S. VC market, which is collected from VentureEconomics. The final sample includes 9,079 unique VC firm-company pairs. Importantly, the dataset covers both pairs for which the VC firm took a board seat and pairs for which it did not. We can thereby separately study whether the VC firm invested and whether it took a board seat, conditional on an investment. Our data are limited to investments for which VentureEconomics report the name of at least one VC firm partner and at least one founder. This restriction follows from our strategy of using names to infer the ethnicity of each individual. We focus on eight ethnicities/groups: Jewish, Indian (i.e., from India), Chinese, Korean, Hispanic, Russian, Japanese and Vietnamese. These groups are chosen because they can be identified using our data on names, and they represent important minority ethnicities/groups in the U. Our empirical methodology is straightforward, yet it permits us to assess the importance of shared ethnicity. We run a series of regressions with "Same Ethnicity" as the focal independent variable (which is a dummy that takes the value 1 if the VC partner and founder have the same ethnicity, and is 0 otherwise). All specifications include fixed effects for company industry, location, and year of investment.
We also run separate robustness regressions with company fixed effects and VC firm fixed effects, respectively. Because the coefficient on "Same Ethnicity" remains qualitatively similar across specifications with different included fixed effects, we infer that our results are likely not driven by omitted variables. Including company and VC firm fixed effects also broadens the interpretation of our findings. Our regressions with company fixed effects compares the investment behaviors of the focal VC firm versus other VC firms investing in the focal company; our regressions with VC firm fixed effects compares the focal VC firm's investment behavior in the focal company compared to other companies.
We document five results on matching based on ethnicity. First, a shared ethnicity is associated with a higher probability that the VC firm invests in the company. We derive this result by comparing the instance of shared ethnicity between actual investments and counterfactual ones. Second, conditional on investment, we find that a shared ethnicity is associated with a higher probability that the VC firm takes a board seat. Third, a shared ethnicity is associated with the VC firm being more likely to invest at an early stage of the company. Fourth, a shared ethnicity is associated with the VC firm investing more capital and across more rounds in the company. Finally, we find that a shared ethnicity is associated with the VC firm offering higher pre-money valuation and receive fewer investor-friendly cash flow contingency rights in the financial contract.
As for magnitudes of the estimated effects, a shared ethnicity increases the probability of a match from 4.7 percentage points to 5.7 percentage points, a 21% increase. Conditional on a match, a shared ethnicity increases the probability of a board seat by 16 percentage points, the probability of a first round investment by 10 percentage points, and the total investment amount by $3 million. 2 These findings unambiguously show that a shared ethnicity predicts the existence and intensity of the match between the VC firm and the company.
Our next step is to investigate how such matching relates to investment outcomes. Either relationship is possible, because there are competing rationales for why personal-based matching happens in the VC market. On the one hand, a VC firm could derive several benefits from making co-ethnic investments. Consider a U.S. company founded by an Indian-born entrepreneur that seeks venture funding.
An Indian-born (U.S.-based) VC partner may have soft information that allows him or her to better evaluate the ability and personality of this entrepreneur (Stein, 2002; Petersen & Rajan, 2002; Petersen, 2004; Berger et al., 2005) . Moreover, the partner may be a member of the same ethnic-based social network as the entrepreneur. Such a network can provide the partner with additional soft information, trust and reputation to his/her relationship with the entrepreneur (Greif, 1989 (Greif, , 1993 Landa 1994; Glaeser et al. 2000; Casella & Rauch 2002; Fisman 2003) . The partner and entrepreneur may also have more productive board meetings after the investment is made. This could improve the likelihood the firm will realize a successful exit, given that the board of a venture-backed firm engages in both monitoring and value-add support. If these benefits were important in practice, then we would expect to observe co-ethnic investments to be prevalent and associated with superior performance.
On the other hand, investments with a co-ethnic may instead be associated with worse outcomes.
The Indian-born partner may also be overconfident in his/her ability to evaluate and monitor Indian-born entrepreneurs, thereby matching with companies of inferior quality. Moreover, the partner may feel social pressure from the ethnic-based network to support entrepreneurs from the ethnic network. Rather than improving the VC's monitoring ability, boards with co-ethnic members may hold meetings that are too undemanding and/or impose too few control mechanisms on the entrepreneur. Moreover, unfounded trust could result in less intensive due diligence of the entrepreneurial company.
A second mechanism predicting worse outcomes from co-ethnic financing is groupthink (Janis, 1982) , which is more likely to hold the more similar are the members of a group. 3 While the evidence on groupthink in the social psychology literature is mixed (eg., Tetlock et al. 1992; Esser, 1998) , the possibility that entrepreneurial actions might go unchallenged as a result of personal similarity with the VC may dampen ultimate outcomes. From a resource perspective, redundant ties (as would apply in coethnic networks) are less likely to yield diverse, valuable information (Granovetter, 1973) , which can also hinder economic outcomes. While Granovetter considers the context of the job market, the idea is that "weak" ties (or looser, more diverse networks) are more likely to contain varied and non-redundant information, with beneficial ultimate effects (thus, the strength of weak ties). For example, Huang, Jin & Qian (forthcoming) find that entry by ethnically Chinese firms (from Singapore, Hong Kong and Taiwan) into China is no more successful with regard to profitability than non-ethnically Chinese firms.
Our analysis suggests that matches based on a shared ethnicity are associated with less successful company outcomes. We document a negative correlation between "Same Ethnicity" and the chance of Initial Public Offering or Merger/Acquisition. 4 This result suggests that partners of VC firms either overestimate the benefits of ethnicity when they select portfolio companies or fail to impose a sufficient level of monitoring after the investment is made. 5 This interpretation is supported by our earlier finding that conditional on a match, VCs allocate more entrepreneur-friendly rights in their financial contracts to Tetlock (1979 Tetlock ( : 1314 defines groupthink: "Groupthink occurs when independent critical analysis of the problem facing the group assumes second place to group members' motivation to maintain group solidarity and to avoid creating disunity by expressing unpopular doubts or opinions." 4 Most papers in the VC literature use IPO and M&A outcomes as a proxy for investment success. An arguably better outcome measure would be the internal rate of return (IRR) of the investments, however, these data are not available due to the private nature of entrepreneurial firms and their VC investors. 5 In a related paper, Hegde and Tumlinson (2011) confirm our finding that shared ethnicity predicts matching in the VC industry, but find a positive association with company outcome. This discrepancy can be attributed to critical differences in sample design and empirical methodology. Unlike our paper, Hegde and Tumlinson (i) include both U.S. and foreign VC firms/companies, (ii) code more ethnic groups, including "broad" ones (e.g., AngloSaxon/British), (iii) combine founders and individuals who are hired on later, and (iv) restrict their sample to investments where the VC firm took a board seat.
co-ethnics. An important caveat for this part of our analysis is that we equate the investment outcome with the company's exit mode due to data limitations. This outcome variable is a coarse measure of how VC investments create or destroy value, though it is one that is common in the entrepreneurial finance literature.
To summarize our findings, we show that co-ethnicity is strongly associated with investment matches between VC firms and entrepreneurial companies. A shared ethnicity increases the likelihood of a match occurring, and strengthens the VC firm's involvement conditional on a match. However, this rationale for matching is associated with worse investment outcomes. These empirical patterns are qualitatively similar to those documented by Gompers et al. (2012) , who study matches between VC firms formed in investment syndicates. Like us, they find that co-ethnicity (which they label matching based on "affinity-based characteristics") increases the likelihood of a match but decreases the chance of a successful company outcome.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the data. Section 3 first presents results on matching, and then discusses and distinguishes between competing explanations for our results. Section 4 is a brief concluding discussion.
Data
Sample Design. We collect our data from VentureEconomics, which is one of the largest and most complete databases on VC investments. 6 We restrict our attention to U.S. VC investments in order to eliminate the influence of any institutional differences that exists across countries. We use the part of the VentureEconomics data that includes information on the name of the individuals who are involved in VC investments. The database collects this name information from web pages, news reports, press releases and proprietary surveys. For each company (where information is available), we first identify the name of all company founders. As reported in Panel A of Table 1 , our final sample includes 5,093 unique
individuals who have founded 3,125 unique companies. Untabulated analyses show that our sample is a broad cross-section of company locations, industries, and company ages and development stages at the time of financing.
We then obtain information about all the VCs that invested in each company in our sample. Our dataset covers 2,361 unique individuals working as partners in 966 unique VC firms. Our final sample includes 9,079 unique company-VC firm pairs. Each pair is formed by collapsing information on all (listed) company founders and all (listed) active partners at the VC firm. Importantly, we include both VC firms that took a board seat and VC firms that did not. The inclusion of VC firms with and without a board seat allows us to study not only how an ethnic match relates to the VC firm's investment in the company, but also how it relates to the decision to give the VC firm a board seat, conditional on an investment. This significantly broadens the scope of our study, but it also introduces an empirical challenge: we cannot directly measure the ethnicity of partners in VC firms that did not take a board seat.
VentureEconomics and similar databases do not list the names of the partners who were active at a given point in time in a given VC firm. We approximate the list of active partners by identifying all individual partners in the VC firm who took a board seat in any sample company that the VC firm financed during the same time period that it financed the focal company. Our methodology relies on the assumption that all of the VC firm's active partners were, at least to some degree, involved in each investment. Our conversations with partners at VC firms confirm that this assumption describes the real-world VC investment process. 7 If the assumption were wrong, we may derive biased results on the importance of ethnicity. However, the likely bias is against finding significant results because we would estimate the influence of ethnic ties that do not exist in practice. Suppose in the above example that the Chinese partner at VC Alpha had no involvement in the investment in Company
Gamma. If ethnicity were important then we would not identify it for the VC Alpha-Company Gamma pair. As we outline in Section 3, even in the presence of such possible bias, we find strong and pervasive empirical patterns consistent with the importance of ethnic ties. We also run our tests using only the subsample for which we observe that the VC firm took a board seat in the company. Results are qualitatively very similar for the full sample and this subsample, suggesting that our assumption is a valid one.
Ethnicity. We use each individual's surname to determine his or her ethnicity. Our information on ethnic surnames comes from two sources. First, we use the database constructed by Kerr (2008) , which lists the 100 most common surnames for Chinese, Indian, Japanese, Korean, Russian, Hispanic, and Vietnamese. Secondly, we use a list from Wikipedia of the most common Jewish surnames. 9 We limit our attention to these eight ethnicities/groups because (i) they represent important subgroups that are active in the U.S VC industry, and (ii) the large overlap in surnames makes it difficult identify other ethnicities (e.g., many
common Norwegian surnames are also common Danish surnames). It is formally incorrect to label Jewish people as members of an ethnic group. Rather, Jewish people form a group tied together by religion, culture and heritage. We choose to include Jewish affiliation in our analysis because a large number of VC partners and founders belong to this group. To simplify our use of language in the paper, we refer to Jewish also as an ethnicity.
A typical VC firm assigns one or a few partners to each investment, who become formally responsible for screening, contract negotiations, monitoring, operational support, etc. All major decisions pertaining to whether, when and how to invest are approved at a partner-wide meeting at the VC firm. 8 In an earlier version of this paper we coded the ethnicity of founders and partners using both Kerr's database and biographical information (available for a smaller sample). We found that the there was a very large overlap between these coding methods, confirming that the use of name data captures most individuals from the focal ethnic groups. 9 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category:Jewish_surnames
The fact that we use name data to identify ethnicity introduces two problems to our empirical analysis. First, our estimated regression coefficients are noisy as the explanatory variable "Same Ethnic"
is measured with imprecision from coded name data. This imprecision implies that some co-ethnic ties may have "Same Ethnic" coded as 0, and some non-co-ethnic ties coded as 1. Hence, the two groups formed on the basis of the "Same Ethnic" variable will be more similar (with respect to co-ethnicity) than they would if we were to measure ethnicity better. This implies a bias against finding significant results for co-ethnic ties.
Secondly, we cannot separate between potentially important subgroups within ethnicities. For example, "Hispanics" is not a uniform group but combines people with origins from Cuba, Dominican
Republic, Mexico, Spain, etc. (Portes and Truelove, 1987) . Similarly, the Jewish group combines Jews who have lived several generations in the U.S. with Jews who have recently immigrated from Russia or
Israel, respectively. Because we rely on name data to identify ethnicity, we cannot distinguish between these subgroups. However, this problem also introduces a bias against finding significant result. Suppose ethnic matching matters if both the VC partner and founder were from Cuba, but not if the VC partner is from Cuba and the founder from Mexico. By also identifying the latter case as an ethnic match, we may be less likely to find significant results on matching. Despite these biases we find, as discussed in Section 3, a pervasive pattern of significant results on ethnic matching. From this, one can infer that the problems associated with our identification strategy are small relative to the real-world importance of ethnic matching in the venture capital setting.
Importantly, we can replicate, in untabulated tests, all our main findings for a subsample that excludes founders that are classified as Jewish or Hispanics. Hence, our results do not hinge on the inclusion of these two ethnic groups that may be difficult to correctly classify.
We create the variable "Same Ethnicity", which is the focus of our study, by comparing the ethnicity of any of the company's founders to that of any of the VC firm's partners. The variable takes the value 1 if there was an ethnic match based on the eight ethnic groups we coded (i.e., Chinese-Chinese), and 0 if either there was no ethnic match (i.e., Chinese-Indian) or if none of the individuals were from the coded ethnic groups (i.e., Other-Other). For pairs where there are multiple founders and/or multiple partners, it is possible that there is more than one ethnic tie. As reported in Panel B of Company (1=Yes, 0=No) ." The average company age was 3 years and 44% of investments included a first round investment.
We use two measures of the VC firm's investment scope: "Number of Rounds VC Invested in Company" and "Total Dollar Amount VC Invested in Company (in $m) ." The average number of rounds was 2.2 and the average investment amount, which is a summation over all rounds in which the VC firm invested, was $9.1 million.
We use two variables that measure the degree of company-friendliness of the financial contract:
"Pre-Money Valuation (in $m)" and "Downside Protection Index (Bengtsson and Sensoy, 2011) to ensure that all sample companies have sufficient time to realize their exit. 10 17% of investments resulted in an IPO and 41% in a Merger and Acquisition (M&A). These statistics are somewhat higher than reported in other studies, reflecting the fact that both founders and partners are more likely to report their involvement in a successful venture-backed company. This selective reporting is likely to bias our results against finding results on ethnic ties, because companies with higher ex-ante probability of success likely have access to a broader group of VC firms, including those without an ethnic match. Put differently, ethnic ties plausibly should matter more for firms with low ex-ante probability of success, which are less prevalent in our data, because ethnic ties can alleviate the greater informational frictions surrounding such firms (Akerlof, 1970) .
Empirical Results
Our data was collected in 2009, so this cutoff translates into a 7 year time period of realizing an exit.
Initial Evidence. If ethnic ties were important for how matches are formed in the VC industry, we would expect to observe that they occur with an unusually high frequency. Table 2 presents results consistent with this expectation. In the first column, labeled "VC firms where (at least) one partner has ethnicity", we report the frequency of pairs with (at least) one ethnic partner. As for the most common ethnicities, we note that about 20% VC firms have a Jewish partner, 14% an Indian, and 6% Chinese. In the second column, labeled "Companies where (at least) one founder has ethnicity", we report the frequency of pairs with (at least) one ethnic founder. We note that about 8% have a Jewish founder, 9% an Indian founder, and 6% a Chinese founder. These statistics show that ethnic founders play an important role in the U.S.
entrepreneurship landscape, a finding that has been highlighted by (Wadhwa, et al. 2007 ). However, ethnic partners appear to play an even more important role.
We then compute conditional statistics of the founder's ethnicity based on the partner's ethnicity.
Column three labeled "Companies where (at least) one founder has ethnicity if VC firm has (at least) one
partner with ethnicity" reports the frequency of companies for which a founder shares the same ethnicity as the investing VC firm. This variable is identical to our focal variable "Same Ethnicity" that we use in our regression analysis, except it reports statistics separately for each ethnic group whereas "Same Ethnicity" aggregates this data across all ethnicities.
Comparing across the third column and the fourth column, labeled "Companies where (at least) one founder has ethnicity if VC firm does not have (at least) one partner with ethnicity", reveals that the conditional probabilities of an ethnic founder are overall higher if the partner shares the same ethnicity.
Column five reports the results of a Wilcoxon test, and we find that the difference between columns four and five is significant for the three most common ethnicities: Jewish, Indian and Chinese. This is evidence consistent with the argument that ethnic ties matters for VC investments.
Empirical Strategy. We next conduct more careful empirical tests of the importance of ethnic ties. Our tests proceed in two steps. First, we analyze how the existence of an ethnic tie relates to the likelihood that a company and a VC firm form an investment match (the extensive margin of the investment decision). Second, we analyze how the existence of an ethnic tie relates to the nature of the VC firmcompany match, conditional on one having taken place (the intensive margin). We analyze whether the VC firm took a board seat, the timing of its first investment, the scope of its overall investment, and the design of the financial contract.
To study each of the above phenomena, we run a series of regressions where the dependent variable captures the focal dimension of the VC firm's investment and the key independent variable is "Same Ethnicity". In our baseline specifications, we include fixed effects for the year of the VC firm's first investment in the company, company location (50 US state dummies) and industry (10 dummies based on VentureEconomics 10-segment classification). These controls are included to capture other company characteristics that may correlate with an ethnic tie. We also include "VC IPO Experience" to capture differences in VC firm investment behavior that are related to reputation/skill rather than ethnicity.
For OLS regressions, we cluster residuals by both company and VC firm (Petersen, 2009) . For other regression types, we cluster the residuals by firm. The results remain unchanged.
In addition to our baseline specifications, we run OLS fixed effect regressions that include company fixed effects. We switch to OLS because fixed effect probit models do not converge with our data. The OLS specifications allow us to rule out the influence of any company-specific factors that may correlate with ethnic ties. Moreover, they shed direct light on whether a VC firm with an ethnic match invests differently than other VC firms investing in the same company. This within-company comparison is arguably more interesting than the baseline specification, because a company cannot change the ethnic composition of its team of founders. We also run OLS fixed effect regressions that include VC firm fixed effects. These specifications rule out the influence of any VC-specific factors that may correlate with ethnic ties. We can also use this within-VC firm comparison to study whether the VC firm invests differently in companies where an ethnic tie is present than it does in other companies. On the whole, we find qualitatively similar results in the baseline specifications without fixed effects, the specifications with company fixed effects, and specifications with company fixed effects.
One may argue that the many dimensions of the VC firm's investment in a company are highly correlated with whether the VC firm took a board seat, which in turn may be related to an ethnic tie (we empirically validate this latter relationship). We account for the influence of board seats. In our regressions using the full sample we include "VC Board Seat (1=Yes, 0=No)" as a control variable. We also, in a separate set of regressions, restrict our sample to a subset of VC firm-company pairs for which the VC firm took a board seat. We find qualitatively similar results for the full sample and the board seat subsample.
Results on Matching
Matching. Table 3 presents regression results on how ethnic ties matter for the likelihood that the company and the VC firm form a match. To run these tests, we need to contrast the prevalence of ethnic ties for the matches that were actually formed to those for matches that could have been formed but were not. Thus, we need to identify counterfactual matches for each of the 9,079 actual pairs in our sample. We use data from VentureEconomics to find such counterfactual matches. Specifications 1 through 4 present results where the counterfactual sample includes all investments made by another VC in the same month and (10-segment) industry. Specification 5 through 8 present results where the counterfactual sample includes all investments made by another VC in the same month, (10-segment) industry, and US state.
We note that the coefficient on "Same Ethnicity" is positive and significant in all specifications, confirming that ethnic ties matters for which matches are formed in the US VC industry.
A tabulation of the sample of actual and counterfactual matches illustrates the economic significance of our results. The likelihood of a match is 5.7 percentage points if the founder and VC partner has a co-ethnic tie, and is 4.7 percentage points if they do not. This corresponds to a 21% increase in the likelihood of a match on a univariate basis. Specification 1 is a probit regression with normalized coefficients at the means of the other variables. The coefficient estimate on co-ethnicity remains similar to the estimated effect of the univariate difference.
A possible concern is that our sample of counterfactual matches is too large, which may influence our estimation. Importantly, specifications 2 and 6 cluster residuals by both VC firm and company -a correction that ensures that the statistical significance is not inflated. In untabulated tests, we also restrict the sample of counterfactual matches to one (randomly selected) per actual match. We find that all results presented in Table 3 remain statistically significant.
Board Seats. Table 4 reports results on tests on how ethnic ties matter for whether the VC firm took a board seat, conditional on it making an investment. Again, we find the coefficient on "Same Ethnicity" to be positive and significant in all specifications. Because the result holds even when we include company fixed effects (specification 3), it cannot be explained by some companies being more likely to report the composition of their board. Similarly, because the result holds even when we include VC firm fixed effects (specification 4), the result cannot be explained by some VC firms being more likely to take board seats in all of their investments. Rather, the result shows that VC firms become more involved in a portfolio company if they have an ethnic tie with its founders.
An unreported comparison of means shows that the difference for VC involvement is economically significant: a VC firm with an ethnic tie has a 74% likelihood of taking a board, versus 58%
for other VC firms. The difference is about 16 percentage points, which is similar in specification 1 of Table 4 , which is a probit regression with coefficients normalized at variable means. Table 6 suggests that a shared ethnicity increases the total amount of about 20%, which is in line with the univariate difference.
Timing of Investment.
Financial Contract. Table 7 reports results on how ethnic ties relate to the financial contract used in the investment. In Panel A, the dependent variable is "ln (1 + Pre-Money Valuation)". We find that the VC firm obtained lower pre-money valuations when its partner(s) had an ethnic tie with the company's founder(s). In other words, for a given dollar investment amount, the VC received a smaller equity stake in the presence of an ethnic tie. An unreported comparison of means shows a VC firm with an ethnic tie received an average pre-money valuation of $70 million, versus $58 million for other VC firms.
Specifications 1 and 4 of Panel A of Table 7 suggests an increase in pre-money valuation of between 11% and 20%.
In Panel B, the dependent variable is "Downside Protection Index (Bengtsson and Sensoy, 2011) ."
We find that contracts are more entrepreneur-friendly for investments with an ethnic tie. These results are not significant when we include company fixed effects (specifications 3 and 7), which is not surprising given the weak statistical power of such tests. 11 An unreported comparison of means shows that the mean Downside Protection Index is about one third of a standard deviation lower (4.27 versus 4.73) when the VC firms has an ethnic tie.
Summary of Results on Matching.
Our empirical tests present strong evidence that ethnic ties matter in the U.S. VC industry. We find that the existence of an ethnic tie increases the likelihood that the company and the VC firm form a match and makes the VC firm invest earlier, more and using more favorable to the entrepreneur pricing/terms. Because these results hold in specifications with company fixed effects, we infer that the influence of shared ethnicity is unlikely to be explained by an omitted company characteristic control, but rather reflects the behavior of the focal VC firm as compared to other VC firms investing in the same company. Similarly, because the results hold in specifications with VC firm fixed effects, we infer that omitted VC characteristics are not the explanation. A simple information transmission mechanism, in which co-ethnics learn about deals ahead of others due to shared social networks, can only explain the likelihood of matching but not the set of on heterogeneity within investments (dimensions such as board participation, stage and scope of investment, and terms of the financial contract). The results reflect the behavior of the focal VC firm in its investments with an ethnic tie as compared to its investments without such ties.
In untabulated tests we rerun the specifications in Tables 3-7 but exclude founders who are of Jewish or Hispanic descent. These ethnic groups may be misclassified and/or particularly heterogeneous due to data issues discussed in Section 2. We find qualitatively similar results as for our specifications for the full sample.
Comparison of Our Results
We calculate the dependent variables for each company-VC firm pair by calculating the average pre-money valuation and Downside Protection Index, respectively, over all the rounds in which the VC invested. With company fixed effects, the only source of variation comes from the fact that different VC firms invested in different rounds. However, this variation is low because the pre-money valuations and contract terms are serially correlated across rounds. Amplifying this problem is the fact that data on these variables are often not reported for our sample.
Before we proceed to discuss the possible rationales for ethnic matching, we want to put our results in a broader context by comparing them to findings on other matching correlates. Although one could think of several similarity-based dimensions that can influence matching, we focus on two that have been documented in the existing literature: geographical distance and shared university affiliation.
Because VC firms need to actively monitor and add value to their portfolio companies, they prefer to invest in geographically proximate firms. Figure 1 in Sorenson and Stuart (2001) illustrate how the likelihood of a VC investment decreases with distance. They show that the likelihood of an investment is 0.8% at about 200 miles distance between the VC a focal company, and 1% at about 100 miles distance (the low probabilities reflect a large sample of counterfactual matches). Hence, a doubling of the distance is associated with a 20% univariate increase in the likelihood of an investment, which is of similar magnitude as our result on shared ethnicity. Given a match takes place, we find in our dataset that the economic magnitude for ethnicity is as large as the magnitude for geographical distance. To illustrate, the likelihood of a board seat is univariately 16 percentage points higher for a co-ethnic tie but is only 11 percentage points higher if the VC and company are located below the sample median distance from each other (versus above median distance). The likelihood of a first round investment is univariately 10 percentage points higher for a co-ethnic tie. We find a similar difference when comparing investments above and below the sample median distance. The average total financing amount is univariately $2.5 million higher for a co-ethnic tie. The univariate difference across the above and below median distance is $1.7. In summary, these comparisons illustrate that ethnic-based matching can be as important as distance-based matching.
We can also compare our results to those found for social networks based on a shared university affiliation. As we discussed in the Introduction, several recent papers find strong evidence that such ties matter in different finance settings. Sunesson (2009) takes this notion to the venture capital context, and
shows that a shared affiliation increases the likelihood of a match by 57%. 12 Hence, his results suggest
Sunesson also shows that a shared university affiliation between two VC firms increases the likelihood that they form a syndicate. Bhagwat (2013) find a similar result.
that ethnic-based matching is about a third as important as university-based matching. However, a major limitation of Sunesson's paper is that he studies only investments made in the year 2002, which due to the burst of the dot-com "bubble" may have been a special year. In an earlier version of our paper, we studied hand-coded data from biographies for about a fifth of our sample, and found no result on matching based on a shared university affiliation. We did, however, find results that a match was more likely if both the founder and VC partner attended a top-ranked university. 13 The magnitude on shared top university affiliation was much smaller (about a sixth) than that on shared ethnicity. 14 These findings suggest that ethnicity could be as important, or even more important, than social connections based on university affiliation.
Rationales for Matching
Discussion. Before we begin analyzing the empirical association between ethnic matching and investment outcomes, it is important to note that matching in the VC context has two distinct goals. First, the partner and founder seek to increase the likelihood that the entrepreneurial company will become successful, ideally exited through an Initial Public Offering (IPO). Success is the ultimate prize for both parties: The partner is able to exit the investment, receives monetary payoffs (from carried interest), and strengthens his or her standing in the VC community. The founder also receives payoffs, and may enjoy private benefits from the successful outcome itself or from being subsequently "self-employed" in a successful company.
A second goal of matching is that the partner and the founder want to minimize the transaction costs surrounding the formation and maintenance of their relationship. For the partner, these transaction costs include expenses incurred during due diligence, legal fees for contract negotiation, expenses for travelling to board meetings, etc. Another transaction cost, and arguably the most important one in
We included the following schools in this group: Brown, Caltech, University of Chicago, Cornell, Dartmouth, Columbia, Duke, Harvard, MIT, University of Pennsylvania, Princeton, Yale, Stanford, Cambridge and Oxford. 14 We also found that the magnitude of shared ethnicity was greater than the magnitudes of various operational complementarities between founders and VC partners.
practice, is the partner's opportunity cost of time. The VC firm must carefully economize on how much time the partner spends on each investment, because otherwise it risks forgoing other promising investments and providing inadequate monitoring/support to other portfolio companies. For the founder, the opportunity cost of time is also very valuable. If the founder spends too much time dealing with a given VC firm, then he or she may neglect other investors and/or be unable to place sufficient effort to growing his/her company.
Matching based on shared partner and founder ethnicity would create value in a VC investment if it were to achieve either or both of the goals discussed above. Value creation could occur due to easier communication, more efficient sharing of soft information or more trust among members of the same ethnic subgroup. We label such rationales for matching as "beneficial".
Conversely, a match based on shared ethnicity would destroy value if the likelihood of a successful outcome decreased and/or transaction costs pertaining to relationship were to increase. An obvious question to ask is why a partner and a founder would chose to form a co-ethnic match if it would result in value destruction. One possibility is that they have a behavioral bias that makes them overestimate the skills and capabilities of people who share their ethnicity. Alternatively, they may overestimate the benefits of forming a match with such people. Another possibility, which we discussed in detail in Section 1, is that a too high degree of similarity between founders and partners may result in group-think during board meetings. Finally, founders and partners may respond to pressure from their ethnic subgroup to do business with members of the same subgroup. We label such rationales as "detrimental", since matching based on them does not create value.
Empirical Strategy and its Limitations.
We analyze data on investment outcomes to test whether co-ethnic matches in the VC industry are formed based on beneficial (i.e., value-increasing) or detrimental (i.e., value-destroying) rationales. We define an investment as successful if the company had an M&A or IPO, and then correlate these investment outcomes with our focal independent variable "Same Ethnicity". In addition to "Same Ethnicity", we include controls for investment year, industry and location (i.e., state dummies). We also include as controls the variables we studied in previous tables: company age at the VC's first investment, whether the VC invested in the first round, number of rounds in which the VC invested, dollar amount the VC invested in the company, pre-money valuation, distance between company and VC, and whether the company had any patents 5 years after the first VC round. 15 As such, we study whether the VC firm realized a more/less successful company outcome conditional on the intensity of its investment.
Although our analysis of outcomes allows us to shed some light on the rationale behind ethnic matching, it has four limitations. The first limitation is that we can only study investment outcomes for investments in our sample made prior to 2003. Our data is collected at 2009, so this cutoff ensures that each successful company had sufficient time to realize its exit. The surviving sample includes 4,812 observations, of which 2,499 are matches where the VC firm takes a board seat.
The second limitation is that our tests cannot speak to the association between ethnic matching and transaction costs, such as the VC firm's selection and monitoring efforts. Despite their real-world importance, these costs are not observable features of the VC investment. Therefore, it remains possible that ethnic matching could be formed based on the beneficial rationale of lower transaction costs even if such investments were associated with worse investment outcomes.
The third limitation is that the measure of a successful investment outcome is incomplete and noisy in that attaining an initial public offering is only one coarse measure of entrepreneurial performance.
The private nature of the companies and investors that we study imply a lack of detailed data on investment outcomes. A better measure of investment success would be internal rate of return (IRR). But information on IRRs is neither reported nor can be calculated from the available information. IRR is a function of (1) investment amounts of all rounds, (2) pre-money valuations of all rounds, (3) deal terms of all rounds, and final exit proceeds. However, IRRs are likely higher for IPO/M&A outcomes than for
We exclude "Downside Protection Index (Bengtsson and Sensoy, 2011) " because this variable is only reported for a small subset of our sample, creating problems with statistical power and representativeness.
other exits (a category that includes failed investments). Our interviews with VC partners corroborate this
view.
An additional challenge is that we are unable to perfectly control for other determinants of an IPO, such as the quality of the founder's idea or the nature of the company's other assets. This follows from the fact that we cannot include company fixed effects in the outcome regressions, because our measure of investment outcome is identical for all VC firms investing in the company.
The fourth, and arguably most problematic, limitation is that our tests confound selection and treatment effects. This problem plagues most existing studies of the VC industry (see Sorensen, 2007 , for a discussion), and in our context, selection and treatment could have opposite effects on investment outcomes. Consider a simple theoretical framework where the beneficial rationales for ethnic matching dominate the detrimental rationales, and where the VC firm wishes to maximize the ex-post quality of its portfolio. Accordingly, the VC firm would base its investment choices on the ex-ante quality of available companies and the value creation specific to each matching. In equilibrium, the VC firm would select some co-ethnic investments in lower quality companies over other investments in higher quality companies. Because of such offsetting selection effects, it is difficult to empirically isolate the treatment effect (i.e, value-creation) associated with ethnic matching.
Results on Investment Outcomes
With the above limitations in mind, Table 8 presents our results on the association between coethnic ties and company outcomes. The estimation technique is multinominal logit where the dependent variable is 1 if the company had no reported outcome (i.e., failure), 2 if an M&A exit, and 3 if an IPO exit.
The reported coefficients are compared to a sample where the dependent variable is 1. Specification 1 includes the sample of VC investments with and without a board seat. We find that an IPO outcome is less common when the VC firm has a co-ethnic tie with the company. The result is only weakly significant. Specification 2 limits the sample to investments where the VC took a board seat. We find that an IPO outcome remains less likely with a shared ethnicity and the result is now significant at the 10% level. In unreported tests, we redo specifications 1 and 2 with an ordered probit regression, with the same dependent variable. This test is similar to the multinominal logit except that outcomes are ordered as IPO (best), M&A (second-best), and failure (worst). We find a negative and significant coefficient on "Same
Ethnicity." 16 We also find a negative coefficient on this focal variable in a logit regression where we define IPO and M&A as a successful outcome, coded as 1, and failure coded as 0. Finally, we rerun these test as OLS regressions with VC fixed effects, and obtain similar results.
We conclude that co-ethnic ties appear to be associated with worse investment outcomes. Similar results are obtained by Gompers et al. (2012) who study company outcomes for co-ethnic matches between VC firms in investment syndicates. Combined, these findings point to ethnic matching hampering company performance and, as a result, investor returns.
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In a series of untabulated tests, we rerun the specifications of Table 8 but do so for different subsamples. First, we condition the sample on VC firms that have below and above the sample median experience (based on the "VC IPO Experience"), respectively. Second, we condition the sample on VC firms that are located below or above the sample median distance from their company (based on "Distance between Company and VC"), respectively. Third, we condition the sample on companies that had a patent or not (based on "Patents 5 years after first VC round (1=Yes, 0=No)"), respectively.
Fourth, we condition the sample on young and old companies (based on whether company was below or above sample median for variable "Company Age First Time VC Invested in Company (years)"),
respectively. When we compare the coefficients on "Same Ethnicity" across the different subsamples, we find no significant differences. Overall, these empirical patterns suggests not only that there is a negative average association between co-ethnics and exit likelihood, but also that there is never a positive relationship when we condition the sample based on VC or company characteristics.
An alternative interpretation of our matching outcome result (and suggested by a thoughtful reviewer) beyond our above explanations of irrational overinvesting by co-ethnics and lack of monitoring (direct governance and/or allocating more favorable financial contract terms to the entrepreneur) is that co-ethnic investments only seem to perform poorly because the comparison set performs relatively well.
Therefore, from a return-to-limited partner (LP) perspective, perhaps the co-ethnic investments on average do "well enough" relative to some hurdle rate. This would be a more natural interpretation if we had two additional pieces of information: internal rates of return of the investments and the hurdle rates of the LPs. Of course we have neither -nor do we think that it is possible for researchers to systematically collect such data.! The likelihood of liquidity (IPO or M&A), which we do examine, is likely to be coarsely correlated with the unobserved IRRs, but is certainly a rough proxy.
Concluding Discussion
We investigate the empirical relevance of personal similarity in the U.S. VC market, focusing on coethnicity between VC partners and company founders. Our results show that person-based matching based on a shared ethnicity is a strong predictor of a range of VC investment behavior: the likelihood of an investment in the first place, and conditional on investment, deeper, broader, and earlier VC engagement. We interpret this set of results as consistent with co-ethnicity between VC partner and company founder as easing information frictions to investment. Such frictions can consist of information asymmetry in the classic sense (which could potentially be mitigated among co-ethnics due to trust and/or the threat of punishment or sanctions within the ethnic social network), or due to information about investment opportunities (which could be lowered due to faster and deeper information dissemination within an ethnic social network).
Both types of information frictions are consistent with the empirical pattern of enhanced likelihood of investment matches with co-ethnics. As a result, our initial analysis of this likelihood does not rule out the second type of information friction described above. This is also a feature common to the Gompers et al. (2012) study of ethnic matching in the context of VC syndication and to the Hegde and Tumlinson (2011) study in the case of VC -entrepreneur investment matches. Our study moves beyond this likelihood analysis, however, and investigates investment behavior conditional on an investment match by co-ethnics. These outcomes conditional on investment are: the likelihood that a VC partner takes a board seat in the company, the timing and stage of investment, the scope of investment (number of rounds and amount invested), and terms of the financial contract (valuation and degree to which the contract is "friendly" to the entrepreneur). Our finding of significant co-ethnic effects on these dimensions is consistent with mechanisms of information asymmetry or behavioral preferences for co-ethnics; enhanced information exposure to investment opportunities is less consistent with these overall patterns.
Like the closest studies to ours on personal similarity and investment behavior, a strong interpretation of the resulting causal performance outcomes is elusive. This is because investment matching may be due to unobserved selection. Furthermore, any number of mechanisms could be at work.
For example, a positive performance outcome with co-ethnics could be driven by dampened information asymmetry, enhanced communication, and a more powerful punishment mechanism in the case of defection (due to a shared social network). A negative relationship could be driven by group-think, overconfidence in the co-ethnic's quality, and/or less intensive screening or governance of co-ethnics. The existing literature has not reached a consensus on overall direction of effect (e.g., Gompers et al. 2012 versus Hegde and Tumlinson, 2011) . Our results are consistent with Gompers et al. (2012) finding a negative association of co-ethnicity and performance outcomes. Our evidence that co-ethnicity is accompanied by more entrepreneurial-friendly cash flow rights and valuation points to a possible screening and/or governance explanation. We acknowledge that the variety of possible reasons for the correlation makes a strong interpretation of any analysis of consequences of matching difficult, however.
We therefore present our outcomes analysis as suggestive. Restated, unobserved factors that could be driving the likelihood of a match may also be driving the outcomes associated with a match. This same issue affects the other papers in this arena in the same way, so we are not unique in this limitation.
While our primary aim is in examining the VC-entrepreneur matching context, an area we believe is both important and understudied, it is possible to speculate about how general the co-ethnicity effects are likely to be. We have chosen a context in which there is constrained matching: a given VC partner can only sit on a certain number of boards at a given time, and a given entrepreneurial company can only have a certain number of VC partners on its board. Like other matching contexts in which there is a zero-sum choice involved in that matching with one entity means foregoing other opportunities (e.g., the marriage, job, and college markets), assessing the role of personal similarity in explaining matching seems fairly generic.
We end with a few thoughts for future avenues of research given the results reported here. Given the average characteristics of venture partners in the sample, coupled with the role of personal similarity between entrepreneurial founder and venture partner in explaining match likelihood, issues of efficiency naturally arise. Our aim in this paper was to better understand matching in the market for entrepreneurial finance; we hope that future work will extend this research by delving into these and other questions of the implications of this matching process. (Petersen, 2009 (Petersen, 2009 (Petersen, 2009 (Petersen, 2009 (Petersen, 2009 
